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In recent decades, United States legal scholars have regarded the law
and social sciences movement, and the law and economics movement in
particular, as a way to bring the scientific method into the study of law.1
European legal scholars, in contrast, have long thought of the legal method
as a science in itself.2 This contrast between the continental view and the
common law approach is related to the continental European recognition of
a self-contained scientific approach within legal analysis that distinguishes
it from the common law tendency to borrow from other disciplines outside
the legal system to bring some scientific methodology to law.3
In seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, scholars adhering to the
so-called “rational jurisprudence approach” developed the idea of creating a
deductive method in legal analysis.4 This method sought to state legal rules
with the same clarity and level of generality of mathematical theorems, cre-
ating coherent principles that were self-consistent and finding a logical
structure and methodology from within the legal system.5 The scientific
* Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for
Law and Economics at the University of Minnesota Law School and Professor of Economics at
the University of Bologna, Department of Economics. I would like to thank Theresa Stadheim and
the editors of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal for their valuable research assistance.
1. Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Econom-
ics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (2008); see also Thomas S.
Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the
Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875 (2002) (discussing how the scientific method has come
into more widespread use in United States legal scholarship).
2. Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought:
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
295 (2008) for a comparison of the reception of law and economics in the United States versus the
reception in German-speaking countries. The authors believe this idea can be extended to all of
Europe due to common roots and similar historical factors.
3. Id. at 298.
4. John Witte, Jr., From Homer to Hegel: Ideas of Law and Culture in the West, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1618, 1622 (1991).
5. Id.
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method of these scholars did not borrow from social sciences or other disci-
plines. Rather, it attempted to emulate these disciplines, gaining autonomy
and independent status from them or, in some cases, even helping to set up
the overarching inquiries in these areas of study.6 The common law ap-
proach differs greatly because there is no systematic approach. Law-making
is case-based and inductive. The prevalent way to bring some scientific
rigor into a common law legal system has therefore been to borrow from
other fields, encouraging lawyers, judges, and law students to integrate
knowledge gained in other fields.7
During the last few decades, some U.S. law schools have restruc-
tured—or at least expanded—their curriculum to encourage this approach,8
and Professor Ulen’s paper sets forth ideas on ways to integrate interdisci-
plinary coursework into the legal curriculum. In particular, he examines the
importance of law and economics and other interdisciplinary innovations in
legal scholarship. He then broadens his perspective and lays out a novel
theme for legal education. In Part II of this essay, I will remark on Professor
Ulen’s paper as it relates to the need for multidisciplinary legal curricula
and my recommendations for other ways in which we can enhance multidis-
ciplinary legal education. In Part III, I will then provide some commentary
on Professor Ulen’s views on the study of law and economics. In my con-
clusion, I will summarize and join Professor Ulen in advocating for a
greater emphasis on multidisciplinary legal education.
II. REFORMULATING THE CURRICULUM FOR A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
LEGAL EDUCATION
Professor Ulen makes several interesting points, some of which relate
to structuring the legal curriculum in ways that better serve to educate stu-
dents about the practice of law.9 His paper begins by asserting that the first-
year legal curriculum has been stale for the last one hundred years, teaching
the same courses and using the same methodology—the Socratic and case-
based methods—in spite of the fact that the practice of law has drastically
changed.10 The proportion of legal issues governed by cases as opposed to
regulations has changed dramatically. Nevertheless, we still give an exclu-
6. Id.
7. Thomas S. Ulen, The Impending Train Wreck in Current Legal Education: How We
Might Teach Law as the Scientific Study of Social Governance, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 302 (2009).
8. Some examples are Yale Law School Forum on Multidisciplinary Legal Research, Yale
Law School, http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/MLRForum.htm (last visited May 21, 2009);
the University of Minnesota’s Perspectives curriculum, which unites different areas of study with
legal study, Course Guide, University of Minnesota Law, http://www.law.umn.edu/current/course
guide.html#s8 (last visited May 21, 2009); and Harvard Law School, which encourages students
to take coursework in other departments of the university, Courses and Academic Programs,
Harvard Law School, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/ (last visited May 21, 2009).
9. Ulen, supra note 7.
10. Id. at 303.
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sive emphasis to case-based methodology during the first-year, even though
the balance has tilted quite sensibly in the opposite direction during the last
several decades. In several law schools, during their second and third years,
many students still complete their legal studies with no multidisciplinary
coursework and little exposure to statute-based coursework.11 We may be
shortchanging our students if we continue using these outdated methods.
Professor Ulen points out that recently, several law schools have been
restructuring the first-year curriculum.12 Henry G. Manne was a pioneer in
developing plans for a comprehensive reform to the law school curriculum
centered on the idea of multidisciplinary legal education. His Law and Eco-
nomics Center, which over the years moved from the University of Miami
to Emory and George Mason, provides a leading example of law school
curricular reform. In 1971, the Law and Economics Center offered the first
Economics Institute for Law Professors, an “intensive course in
microeconomic theory taught by distinguished economists to a class of 25
law professors.”13 The early versions of the course did not relate economics
directly to the law.14 This course has been a great success. To date, close to
600 law professors (mostly American and Canadian) have completed the
course.15 Many of them have become recognized scholars in Law and Eco-
nomics.16 In 1976, a separate but similar course was designed for federal
judges17 and achieved similar success. Based on these experiences, several
law schools began offering courses in quantitative methods for lawyers in
which professors highlight the need for students to use this material to do
many things in law, such as calculating damages and arguing antitrust
points.18
11. For example, none of the law schools in Minnesota require any statute-based courses for
graduation. The University of Minnesota requires only Professional Responsibility and Constitu-
tional Law II to be taken in the second year of studies, and it requires only that third-year students
fulfill a writing requirement through moot court, journal membership, or a seminar; The Curricu-
lum, University of Minnesota Law, http://www.law.umn.edu/current/curriculum.html (last visited
May 21, 2009). William Mitchell likewise does not require statute-based coursework; Your First
and Second Years of Law School, William Mitchell College of Law, http://www.wmitchell.edu/
curriculum/curriculum/Mitchell-law-school-JD.asp (last visited May 21, 2009). Hamline does re-
quire a Perspectives course but no statute-based coursework; The JD (Juris Doctor) Program,
Hamline University School of Law, http://law.hamline.edu/node/1204 (last visited May 21, 2009).
St. Thomas has more upper-level requirements, but still no statute-based requirements; Upper
Level Curriculum, University of St. Thomas School of Law, http://www.stthomas.edu/law/aca-
demics/Upper.html (last visited May 21, 2009).
12. See Ulen, supra note 7, at 303.
13. HENRY G. MANNE, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY




17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 13.
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The plan found its most mature incarnation when Henry Manne was
dean at George Mason Law School during the 1980s and 1990s.19 During
those years, George Mason Law School led the competition in developing a
comprehensive curriculum centered on law and economics, which later led
to the development of six joint-degree programs in law and economics in
collaboration with the University’s Department of Economics.20 George
Mason developed its curriculum around the idea that specialization was the
way to succeed in academia.21 Economic analysis became the methodologi-
cal specialization embraced by the George Mason faculty that proved to be
quite an important ingredient for George Mason’s success.22 Since the
1980s, George Mason Law School has required all first-year students to
take a course in analytical methods for law.23 During the 1990s, Economic
Foundations became the biggest first-year course, with four units in the first
semester and three units in the second semester.24 It brought tools from
decision theory, economics, and other quantitative methods into the analysis
of law.25 Thanks to its specialization, this program acquired international
recognition in the field comparable to that of more established ivy-league
institutions, becoming recognized as a leading center of research in law and
economics, constitutional political economy, and public choice theory.26
George Mason developed a distinguished record in the field of law and
economics—it is the academic home of three out of the ten scholars who
have been recognized as “founding fathers” of law and economics (Palgrave
in 1998), as well as two Nobel Prize economists (James M. Buchanan in
1986 and Vernon L. Smith in 2002).27 This is quite a remarkable record for
a young institution of its sort.
Over the years, other more established institutions—among which
Northwestern University Law School probably represents the most success-
19. MANNE, supra note 13, at 19.
20. LLM & Joint Degrees, George Mason University School of Law, http://www.law.gmu.
edu/academics/llm (last visited May 21, 2009).
21. MANNE, supra note 13.
22. Id.
23. JD Curriculum, Fall 2007 and Later, George Mason University School of Law, http://
www.law.gmu.edu/academics/degrees/jd/curriculum/2007fall (last visited May 21, 2009).
24. Id.
25. See Course Descriptions, George Mason University School of Law, http://www.law.gmu.
edu/academics/courses (last visited May 21, 2009).
26. Two of the founding fathers of public choice theory, James M. Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock, are currently on the faculty at George Mason Law. See also The James Buchanan Center
for Political Economy, About the James M. Buchanan Center, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/about.html
(last visited May 21, 2009).
27. James Buchanan has for many years taught at George Mason University and after his
recent retirement continued to serve as Advisory Director of the James Buchanan Center for Polit-
ical Economy at George Mason Law. The James Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Who
Are We?, http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/ (last visited May 24, 2009). Vernon Smith taught at George
Mason University, where he held a joint appointment at the Law School and Department of Eco-
nomics from 2000 through 2008.
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ful example—followed a similar approach because they also came to realize
the importance and the marketing appeal of providing students with a mul-
tidisciplinary legal education.28 These specialized programs ensure that law
graduates can demonstrate depth as well as breadth in their education, pre-
paring them for the new challenges of academic and legal careers. North-
western Law School currently ranks highest in terms of interdisciplinary
faculty29 and maintains a solid record in terms of faculty scholarship in
empirical legal studies and economic analysis.30 Several other leading insti-
tutions have taken steps to integrate the findings and methodologies of the
social sciences into their curriculum.31 In many situations, specialized de-
grees (LLM and JM degrees in Law & Economics, as well as specialized
Ph.D. degrees in law and economics, such as the recent Vanderbilt exam-
ple)32 have become the natural outgrowth of the faculty research interest in
the field of law and economics and related disciplines.33 These degree pro-
grams happily complement the strength of the faculty in these fields of re-
search, providing students with an opportunity to acquire a
multidisciplinary perspective on the law.34
On a more local note, the University of St. Thomas School of Law’s
neighboring school, the University of Minnesota Law School35—a school
that many would regard as ideologically progressive but somewhat con-
servative in terms of legal methodology—has been reforming its first-year
28. At Northwestern Law, every first-year student must take a course on interdisciplinary
perspectives in the law. First Year Curriculum, Northwestern Law, http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/1lplan.html (last visited May 21, 2009). Worthy of men-
tion is also the emphasis on interdisciplinary legal education traditionally placed by the University
of Southern California Law School and in recent years, the attention to empirical legal studies at
Cornell Law School.
29. This ranking is obtained by measuring the percentage of faculty members with Ph.D.-
training in social sciences.
30. Northwestern Law, Faculty Research & Achievement, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
faculty/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
31. One example is Columbia Law, which has developed a curriculum in Law and Social
Sciences; Law and Social Sciences, Columbia Law School, http://www.law.columbia.edu/llm_jsd/
grad_studies/courses/social_sciences (last visited May 21, 2009).
32. Vanderbilt recently added a Ph.D. degree program in Law and Economics; Ph.D. Pro-
gram in Law & Economics, Vanderbilt Law & Economics, http://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/
academic-programs/phd-program-in-law—economics/index.aspx (last visited May 21, 2009).
33. Many schools offer joint JD/Ph.D. degrees or joint JD/MA degrees.  Examples are Stan-
ford University, Joint Degree Programs, SLS Home, http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/de-
grees/joint/#joint_degrees (last visited May 21, 2009); University of Chicago, Joint Degrees, The
University of Chicago, The Law School, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/prospective/joint.html (last
visited May 21, 2009); and Yale, Joint Degree, Yale Law School, http://www.law.yale.edu/aca-
demics/jointdegrees.asp (last visited May 21, 2009).
34. Harvard Law School has also been experimenting with major changes in their first-year
curriculum. There is no lack of attempts in the development of a more multidisciplinary approach
to legal education. Harvard Law School, Programs of Study, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academ-
ics/degrees/jd/pos/index.html (last visited May 18, 2009).
35. The present author has been affiliated with the University of Minnesota Law School
since 2006.
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curriculum. One of the centerpieces of the curriculum reform at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota is to bring different perspectives to the first-year curricu-
lum, including a course titled “Perspectives in Law.” This course, offered in
first-year and upper-year sections, is team-taught by faculty who approach
the law from three different disciplinary perspectives. The disciplines
presented vary from year to year. In 2009, the disciplinary perspectives cov-
ered in the course will include legal history, law and economics, and critical
theory. In 2010, two new teachers will rotate into the team, adding a law
and society and a feminist jurisprudence perspective to the course. During
the course, each faculty member introduces students to a different method-
ological approach and applies his or her methodology to legal issues drawn
from the first-year curriculum. The topics presented also vary from year to
year. In 2009, for example, topics have ranged from the boundaries of the
market to attribution of responsibility in the law, while in 2010 they aim to
expand the focus to procedural and constitutional issues. The purpose of the
course is to help students appreciate the complexity of the law through the
study of legal rules from competing and complementary perspectives and to
help students better understand the connections between legal theory and
legal rulemaking. Students complete each of the three sections of the course
by tackling a practical problem.
Professor Ulen mentions in his paper the importance of lawyers who
are familiar with more than just the legal issues in their clients’ cases. He
suggests that lawyers should become somewhat versed in other academic
disciplines, which can be accomplished in a number of ways.36 One idea is
to allow specializations. Many schools offer students the opportunity to spe-
cialize in one or more areas of the law through concentrations or specialized
tracks.37 Many law schools allow students to do this by taking graduate and
undergraduate courses in the affiliated departments, not just in the law
schools. Law schools should capitalize on such cross-campus opportunities.
If students know what area of law they are interested in, faculty can en-
courage them to choose a graduate-level course in a relevant area (finance,
for example, for students who know they will be practicing in mergers and
acquisitions).
One could argue, however, that a multidisciplinary approach may not
be necessary for all students, so perhaps no firm requirement should be
instituted. For example, a student who plans to practice patent law after
graduation likely already has extensive coursework in mathematics and sci-
ence to help him provide the best services for his client. Tax lawyers likely
already have some coursework in accounting or math. Students enter law
school with undergraduate degrees in a variety of disciplines. Some may
36. Professor Ulen discusses a number of ways to accomplish this goal in his paper. See
Ulen, supra note 7.
37. Some schools have taken the specialization idea further than other American law schools.
MANNE, supra note 13, at 19.
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enter an area of law based on their undergraduate majors, and as such, they
already have a background sufficient to help them counsel their clients.
In addition, as Professor Ulen states, the field of law needs problem
solvers, not necessarily pit bull lawyers who want to take every matter into
litigation.38 This brings us back to what Professor Ulen said about the em-
phasis in legal education on the study of appellate cases.39 Trying to under-
stand the law by looking at cases is like trying to understand what marriage
is about by studying divorce cases. While divorce may be the tip of the
iceberg, it is not a representative description of marriage. First, many rela-
tionships are not disputed; they do not lead to dispute, and that is what more
lawyers should care about.40 Lawyers who want to work as corporate coun-
sel need to be attentive to that portion of cases. They should not want to
bring every case to litigation; rather, they should want their clients’ cases to
work out just as much as we want marriages to succeed rather than dissolve.
Second, of the cases that end up in a dispute, few end up litigated.41 If we
only examine cases, we only study a biased sample of disputes. We need to
understand the selection mechanism of cases to have an idea of what we are
looking at and what we are missing in the analysis. The irony is that there is
a strong emphasis on litigated cases within case law and very little attention
to the rest of the world—i.e., cases that are not disputed in the first place
and cases that are disputed and settled out of court. If these types of cases
are not represented in the sample of analyzed cases, we essentially end up
with a very biased picture of reality that ignores the fact that lawyers must
not only know how to litigate, but also how to prevent litigation.
Professor Ulen thinks it is important for students to understand some-
thing about law and economics, especially as it might apply to the first-year
curriculum.42 Law and economics scholars, for example, made break-
throughs in contract law and in property law. Students would benefit from
coursework in this area, or at least in the scientific methods used in law and
economics, because it provides them with another tool of legal inquiry. This
benefit is another reason why the addition of law and economics theory into
legal coursework would better serve law students. It gives students a per-
38. In his paper, Professor Ulen describes a situation in which litigation only occurs when
communication has broken down or one of the parties is a newcomer not aware of the social
norms. Ulen, supra note 7, at 311. He argues that a lawyer with multidisciplinary training might
be better able to counsel clients to avoid litigation because he understands client needs. Id.
39. See id. at n.104.
40. Id.
41. Only about three percent of disputes ever get litigated. Stephen Lee, Litigation Statistics,
http://newsaic.com/mwcivil.html (last visited May 24, 2009). Law schools are responding by pre-
paring students in Alternative Dispute Resolution and Client Counseling. One example is Colum-
bia Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution, Columbia Law School, http://www.law.columbia.edu/
center_program/adr (last visited May 21, 2009).
42. Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law
School and Law and Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 40 (2004).
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spective on how things should work and how they often do work in real life,
rather than just studying appellate decisions.
Contracts offer one prime example. When the economist studies con-
tracts, he strives to design incentives in such a way that the contracts will be
self-enforcing. Economists do not want to rely on legal mechanisms for
enforcement—their goal is to structure contracts in such a way that parties
will do what is expected without need of external enforcement. Those in-
struments are as important—maybe more important—than the instrument
we provide to students, which is how to use legal remedies to enforce con-
tracts. By the time you get to legal remedies for contract enforcement, it is
too late.  You have failed at your objective. These institutional tools are not
currently offered to law students, and economics is one of the fields that
provide very valuable tools that complement the tools offered in the current
curriculum of law schools.
III. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN THE STUDY OF LAW
There have been three main approaches to economic analysis, and two
of them are in a way parallel to the dichotomy between the Socratic
method/case-based legislation and legislation subject to interpretation
through the deductive method. The Chicago approach articulated by the
Chicago School in Law and Economics43 can be viewed as the economic
version of the inductive case-based method used in the Anglo-American
system of legal education, while the Yale normative school44 can be viewed
as the economic version of the deductive legislative design/regulatory de-
sign approach used in the continental European law schools.
The Chicago positive approach to law and economics is built around a
testable positive claim, commonly referred to as the “efficiency of the com-
mon law” hypothesis.45 Under this approach, some mechanisms in case se-
lection and in the decision process in courts create a natural selection of
better rules so that over time, the common law system has produced and
improved legal rules in the same way that nature, through natural selection,
improves on species.46 This testable hypothesis has played a significant role
in the Chicago approach—much of the work of the Chicago school in the
1970s and 1980s involved taking interesting problems that were solved by
common law and doing an economic analysis on them to find that the com-
mon law was able to generate a rule exactly identical to what a group of
economists would have decided. This result happened even though judges
had no training in economics and the litigants had no incentive to create
efficient rules.
43. Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics, 18
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According to the common law hypothesis, first articulated by Ronald
Coase47 and later extended by scholars such as Paul Rubin, George Priest
and Richard Posner,48 common law rules attempt to allocate resources in
either a Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficient manner. According to these schol-
ars, efficiency is the predominant factor in shaping the common law.49 Pos-
ner, in several of his writings, contends that efficiency is a justifiable
criterion for judicial decision-making because considerations of “justice”
introduce unacceptable ambiguity into the judicial process.50 However, the
Chicago scholars acknowledge that while economic perspectives are crucial
for a positive analysis of the efficiency of legal rules, economists have a
limited role in providing normative prescriptions for social change or legal
reform.51
Once we move away from the common law process and examine the
legislative mechanism as a way to produce law, trust in the efficiency of the
common law hypothesis must be set aside and we need to rely on something
else to support the idea that legislation may evolve towards efficiency. This
is where the tension arises between the Virginia and Yale schools. The Vir-
ginia school is the public choice oriented school that tried to identify fail-
ures in politics in the same way that conventional economists identify
market failures.52 The Yale school has built an enviable group of law and
economics scholars who share much of the economic methodology of the
other schools but push it to formulate normative propositions on what the
law ought to be like, recognizing that efficiency could never be the only and
ultimate end of a legal system.53
The third approach, the so-called functional approach to law and eco-
nomics, which synthesizes the positive and normative approaches (and for
which I generally cite my former teacher Robert Cooter), shows the diffi-
culty in evaluating the efficiency of a rule by itself.54 There are so many
side effects created by legal intervention that escape the analysis of even the
best economist. As Robert Cooter often tells his students as a methodologi-
cal disclaimer at the beginning of his law and economics seminar, even if
we asked the best team of economists whether the price of potatoes is effi-
cient today, they could not answer because there is so much information
47. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
48. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977); Richard A. Posner, What do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1994).
49. Parisi, supra note 43.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi, Scuole e Tendenze nella Analisi Economica del
Diritto, 147 BIBLIOTECA DELLA LIBERT `A 3, 3–20 (1998).
53. See Ejan Mackaay, History of Law and Economics, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON. 65
(2000).
54. Parisi, supra note 43.
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that they would need to have to make that determination. Economists would
answer the question by looking at the process that generated the price. If
that process is a healthy market mechanism, if it is a competitive market,
and if there are no market failures, then we could trust that the price of
potatoes is efficient. This potato metaphor is used to explain the efficiency
of law. The functional approach to law focuses not so much on the mechan-
ics of specific legal rules, but rather on the production of legal rules. If the
process that generates the legal rules is a healthy process, then we can trust
that the result will be efficient as well. Put differently, the focus is on the
production of legal rules as opposed to the substance of specific legal rules.
The efficiency of the common law hypothesis starts to show its own
shortcomings when viewed through the lens of functional economic analy-
sis. The efficiency of the common law hypothesis initially attracted the at-
tention of many economic scholars; everybody seemed to agree on this
hypothesis. However, if you asked them to elaborate on why they believed
that common law was efficient, they had very different answers. There are
two ways to group these various explanations: those on the demand-side55
and those on the supply-side.56 Demand-side explanations assert that com-
mon law generates efficient rules because litigants ask for efficient prece-
dents.57 It is in their own interest to have efficient rules in place. There is
money left on the table if a case is decided with an inefficient rule, and
therefore, litigants will continue litigating cases subject to inefficient
rules.58 In the event that neither litigant is interested in setting a precedent
(or, according to some scholars, when the costs imposed by the inefficient
rule are not large enough to warrant going to court), the rule in question will
remain in force whether it is efficient or not and the parties will settle out of
court.59
In contrast to those on the demand-side are supply-side scholars, such
as Posner, who believe that judges have their own incentives.60 Judges may
wish to be famous or they may like leisure time and know therefore that if
they decide cases efficiently, the rate of litigation will go down.61 These
mixed incentives of reputation, fame, promotion, and even laziness, push
judges to create efficient precedents.62
55. Rubin, Priest, and Klein have all written on this subject. See Priest, supra note 48; Rubin,
supra note 48; George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
56. Posner, supra note 48.
57. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dy-
namic Model, 116 PUBLIC CHOICE 419, 419 (2003).
58. Id.
59. Rubin, supra note 48, at 56; Priest, supra note 48, at 65–75.
60. See Posner, supra note 48.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Interestingly, the demand-side and the supply-side explanations both
agree that the common law leads to efficiency.63 The irony is that every
sensible economist knows that the equilibrium is not given by demand or
supply independently—demand and supply must be combined. What hap-
pens if you put demand and supply together? Recent work has demonstrated
that by doing so, the natural selection of efficient rules may not occur after
all because there is some adverse selection—the selection of cases brought
to litigation is neither a random nor a representative sample of all dis-
putes.64 Plaintiffs bring a case to court if the expected net return from the
case is positive. The net expected value of the case depends, of course, on
the merits of the case. It also depends, however, on the ideological propen-
sity of the judge. Since plaintiffs have full control over whether to bring a
case to court, a plaintiff will not do so unless factors balance out for him or
her. The combined presence of differences in judges’ ideology and a plain-
tiff’s case selection generates a monotonic upward trend in the evolution of
legal rules and remedies.65
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Ulen sets forth some very interesting ideas. He recognizes
that there is something missing in what law students receive from their legal
education and that adding coursework in the scientific method or in law and
economics might be a good way to fill this gap. I agree that this addition
would be helpful for many students. Many of the concepts they learn in
their first-year contracts and property courses would be better understood
from a law and economics perspective, or might even be overturned com-
pletely. Professor Ulen also calls for a multidisciplinary approach to legal
education. In my estimation, this may not be necessary for all students who
already have attained undergraduate degrees in varying fields and will prac-
tice law in areas utilizing those fields. A prime example is patent law,
which already fundamentally requires a background in the sciences in order
for a lawyer to be effective as a practitioner. Nonetheless, many students
could benefit from a more multidisciplinary approach to their legal educa-
tion. As Professor Ulen has stated, the study of law has not changed to
adapt to the realities of legal practice. Adding multidisciplinary coursework,
scientific method coursework, and practical training would go a long way in
ensuring that we provide the legal profession with new lawyers prepared to
look at their clients’ needs from all angles.
63. See Fon & Parisi, supra note 57.
64. Id.
65. Id.
